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# *Tte* in Complementizer Use Is a Strong Logophoric Complementizer\*

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## 1 Introduction

The Japanese particle *tte* has many uses. Okamoto and Ono (2005) distinguish five: as an object complement marker, as a topic marker, as a conjunctive particle, as a semi-sentence-final particle, and as a sentence-final particle. One might want to add that *tte* is also used as an obligatory particle in echo questions (Sudo 2007). Since *tte* indicates a speech report in many of its uses, it is also known as a “quotation marker” (Suzuki 1998), “quotative particle” (Okamoto and Ono 2005), or “quotative complementizer” (Suzuki 2007, 2011).

The usage that we are interested in in this paper is its use as an object complement marker in which it can be substituted by the complementizer *to* in speech and thought reports (disregarding subtle differences in register).

- (1) Taroo-san-wa Mariko-san-ga byooki da { to / tte } i-tta.  
Taro-TOP Mariko-NOM sick COP C / tte say-PAST  
‘Taro said that Mariko was sick.’

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## 2 Background and research question

Speech act verbs like *claim* and other assertive attitude verbs can be used (a) reportatively, i.e. to report a speech act, as in (2-a), or (b) performatively, i.e. to perform a speech act, as in (2-b).

- (2) a. Peter claims that the information he gave is correct.  
 b. I hereby claim that the information I gave is correct.

Reportative markers that allow embedding under assertive attitude verbs usually have a restricted interpretation when the verb is used performatively. Here we give two examples from German.

Our first example is the reportative modal *sollen* ('shall'). *Sollen* can be used under verbs like *behaupten* ('claim'). When the verb is used reportatively, as in (3-a), *sollen* has an embedded interpretation (AttV > REP) and a concord interpretation (AttV=REP); see Schenner (2008) for a discussion of the different readings. When the verb is used performatively, as in (3-b), it only has an embedded interpretation (AttV > REP).

- (3) a. Peter behauptet, dass Maria krank sein soll.  
 Peter claims that Maria sick be REP  
 'Peter claims that someone said Maria is sick.' AttV > REP  
 'Peter claims that Maria is sick.' AttV=REP
- b. Ich behaupte (hiermit), dass Maria krank sein soll.  
 I claim (hereby) that Maria sick be REP  
 'I claim that someone said Maria is sick.' AttV > REP  
 #'I claim that Maria is sick.' #AttV=REP

Our second example is reportative mood marking on the verb.<sup>1</sup> Reportative mood in German can be used in the complement of verbs of saying and thinking. When the verb is used reportatively, as in (4-a), reportative mood has only concord interpretations (AttV=REP), see Schlenker (2003), Schwager (2010), Sode (2014), Bary and Maier (2020). When the verb is used performatively, as in (4-b), reportative mood cannot be used and the sentence becomes infelicitous (#AttV=REP), see Jäger (1970), Schlenker (2003), Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø (2004).

- (4) a. Peter behauptet, dass Maria krank sei.  
 Peter claim that Maria sick be.REP

<sup>1</sup> Other names for this reportative mood used in the literature include "reportive subjunctive" (Fabricius-Hansen and Sæbø 2004) and "logophoric mood" (Schlenker 2003).

*‘Peter claims that someone said Maria is sick.’	AttV > REP
‘Peter claims that Maria is sick.’	AttV=REP
b. #Ich behaupte (hiermit), dass Maria krank sei.	
I claim (hereby) that Maria sick be.REP	
*‘I claim that someone said Maria is sick.’	AttV > REP
#‘I claim that Maria is sick.’	#AttV=REP

The evidence from German suggests that reportative markers resist a concord interpretation if the attitude verb is used performatively. If the reportative marker allows for an embedded interpretation (= AttV > REP), as in the case of the reportative modal *sollen* in German in (3-b), it reverts to this interpretation. If it does not (as in the case of reportative mood in (4-b)), it leads to infelicity. We call the infelicity due to a performative use of the attitude verb **anti-performativity effect**.

Since *tte* in complementizer use has the same interpretation options as the complementizer *to*, we can exclude that *tte* is a reportative modal (or evidential, for that matter) since it never has any embedded interpretations and does not require that there was an actual speech act performed.

- (5) Taroo-san-wa jibun ga onaka-ga sui-te-ta {tte / to }  
 Taro-TOP self-NOM stomach-NOM empty-STAT-PAST tte / C  
 omo-tta kedo nani-mo iwa-na-katta.  
 think-PAST but anything say-NEG-PAST  
 ‘Taro thought that he was hungry but he didn’t say anything.’

What has not been tested yet to our knowledge is whether *tte*-complements show an anti-performativity effect when the attitude verb is used performatively. The following section reports the results of a survey where we tested this.

### 3 Survey

#### 3.1 Participants

Sixty-six Japanese-speaking college students were recruited and participated in this study. They were first-year students enrolled in an English class at Mie University in Mie, Japan, and had no prior knowledge about linguistics. The participants filled out the survey that consisted of thirty questions for about ten minutes and received no compensation. One participant was excluded because they were not a Japanese native speaker, and four participants were excluded because they skipped five or more questions. The data from sixty-one participants are analyzed.


### 3.2 Procedure

Participants were given a sheet of paper with instructions and questions. The instructions asked them to judge how felicitous the following sentences were in the given context. The participants were also asked to follow their intuition when they were answering the survey. They were asked to give judgments basically between Good (“Good in the given context”) versus Bad (“Bad in the given context, or Not good at all”). Only when they found it hard to judge between the two could they give an intermediate judgment “?” (comparatively good) or “Bad?” (comparatively bad). That is, a four-point scale was used, though they were encouraged to give binary judgments. Each stimulus sentence was preceded by a sentence to give some context and the context sentence and the stimulus sentence constituted a dialogue. Each stimulus sentence had a bracket before it, so the participants could fill in their judgments in the brackets. There were thirty sentences to judge in total. After collecting the data, the judgments were converted numerically (Good = 1, ? = 2, Bad? = 3, Bad = 4) and analyzed.

### 3.3 Setting up a baseline – “Omou” for first-person subject

Our research question is to investigate whether *tte*-complements show an anti-performativity effect under an attitude verb in a performative use. There were two challenges in creating Japanese stimulus sentences. First, we could not just translate German examples into Japanese to see if there are parallel facts. In German examples, we used *behaupten* ‘claim’, but the counterpart of this in Japanese (*shuchoo-suru*) does not embed *tte*-complements well. This is probably because *tte* is used most naturally in a casual, colloquial context, which does not match the formal air that *shuchoo-suru* has. Consequently, we extensively used *omou* ‘think’ for our

Figure 1: Ratings by subject type and Omou form



stimulus sentences.<sup>2</sup>

Secondly, the combination of the facts that *tte* is most naturally used in a casual and colloquial context and that argument-drop happens in casual speech in colloquial Japanese made it difficult to have an overt subject in the root clause when it corresponded to the speaker (i.e. performative use). That is, in order to have natural-sounding sentences, we had to omit the first-person subject and use instead *pro*, but still guarantee that the root verb was associated with the root subject, not the embedded subject. To solve this challenge, we first compared different forms of *omou* ‘think’ – the plain form and the stative form, in sentences with the first-person subject (6) and in a third-person subject (7).<sup>3</sup> The numbers after the verb indicate the mean of the judgment (Good: 1, Bad: 4).

- (6) Q: Anata-no kasa-wa doko?  
 You-GEN umbrella-TOP where  
 ‘Where’s your umbrella?’
- A: Watasi-wa kasa-o densha-ni wasure-ta to  
 I-TOP umbrella-ACC train-in forget-PAST C  
 { *omou* (1.05) / *omo-tteiru* (1.39) }.  
 think think-STAT  
 ‘I think that I forgot the umbrella on the train.’
- (7) Q: Peter-no kasa-wa doko?  
 Peter-GEN umbrella-TOP where  
 ‘Where’s Peter’s umbrella?’
- A: Ie da kedo, Peter-wa kasa-o densha-ni wasure-ta  
 home COP but Peter-TOP umbrella-ACC train-in forget-PAST  
 to { *omou* (2.46) / *omo-tteiru* (1.13) } (yo).  
 C think think-STAT PART  
 ‘It is at home, but Peter thinks that he forgot the umbrella on the train.’

Figure 1 summarizes the results.<sup>4</sup> The mean score for the condition of the first-person plain-form verb was 1.05 ( $SD = .384$ ), for the first-person stative form,  $M = 1.39$  ( $SD = .936$ ), for the third-person plain form,  $M = 2.46$  ( $SD = 1.501$ ), and for the third-person stative form  $M = 1.13$  ( $SD = .562$ ). Statistical analysis using maximally specified linear mixed-effects model

<sup>2</sup> Note that the anti-performativity effect with reportative mood in German is also found with verbs of thinking, see Jäger (1970), Schlenker (2003).

<sup>3</sup> The tendency for the plain forms of verbs of thinking to be incompatible with a third-person subject is discussed in Horikawa (1991). We thank David Oshima for pointing this out.

<sup>4</sup> Throughout this paper, the error bars represent a 95% confidence interval.

reveals main effects of subject type ( $p < .01$ ,  $t = 8.514$ ) and of the verb form ( $p = .038$ ,  $t = 2.079$ ) and, importantly, an interaction ( $p < .01$ ,  $t = -7.141$ ) indicating that the plain form of *omou* is significantly marked in a sentence where the associated subject is the third person.


We take advantage of this and will use the plain form of *omou* to be associated with the first-person subject in the following examples.

### 3.4 Comparison of *to* and *tte*


We contrasted *to* and *tte* in similar contexts. Since the plain form of *omou* is used (as exemplified in (8)<sup>5</sup>), the intended root subject is the speaker (though not overtly present), and thus the attitude verb is guaranteed to be used performatively.

- (8) Q: Peter-ni denwa-o kakete kureru?  
 Peter-DAT telephone-ACC call give  
 ‘Will you call Peter?’  
 A: Kare-wa mada neteru { *to* (1.00) / *tte* (3.31) } omou.  
 he-TOP still asleep C tte think  
 ‘I think he is still asleep.’

We had three different kinds of sentences in parallel settings, as in (8). Figure 2 summarizes the averaged results of these sentences. The mean score for the condition using *to* was 1.03 ( $SD = .194$ ), and for the condition using *tte*,  $M = 3.56$  ( $SD = .887$ ). Statistical analysis using maximally specified linear mixed-effects model reveals the main effect of the complementizer type ( $p < .01$ ,  $t = 19.43$ ). The results show that *tte*, but not *to*, exhibits an anti-performativity effect. To our knowledge, this contrast between *to* and *tte* has not been demonstrated in the literature.



<sup>5</sup> One might notice that the dialogue is not perfectly congruent. i.e. the question asks the second speaker to call Peter, but they do not answer this question directly by giving yes or no; instead, they utter the sentence in (8-A), which serves as an excuse not to call Peter. We deliberately used this design so we could compare the results that are discussed in 3.5.



### 3.5 Anti-anti-performativity effect in embedded contexts

We also found that the strong contrasts we found in 3.4 vanished in certain contexts – in the past tense and embedded contexts, such as the *kara* (‘because’) clause and a context where one poses a “question-to-oneself” (*ja nai ka* (‘is it not?’)). These contexts can be regarded as reporting one’s thoughts, i.e. the verb is used reportatively, rather than performatively.

(9) Q: Nande Peter-ni denwa-o kake na-katta no?  
 why Peter-DAT telephone-ACC call NEG-PAST PART  
 ‘Why didn’t you call Peter?’

A: Kare-wa mada neteru { to (1.00) / tte (1.30) } omo-tta kara.  
 he-TOP still asleep C tte think-PAST because  
 ‘Because I thought he would still be asleep.’

Figure 3 summarizes the results of (8) and (9). For the sentences using *to*, both (8) and (9) were invariantly rated 1.0 ( $SD = 0$ ). For the sentences with *tte* in (8),  $M = 3.31$ ,  $SD = 1.057$ , whereas for (9),  $M = 1.30$ ,  $SD = 0.738$ . Statistical analysis reveals a main effect of the complementizer type ( $p = .01$ ,  $t = 2.539$ ), and importantly, a significant interaction ( $p < .01$ ,  $t = 12.270$ ). The results that show that *tte* becomes felicitous in a non-performative context strongly suggest that *tte* has an anti-performativity effect.

## 4 Proposal

We assume that both, *to* and *tte* are logophoric complementizers in the sense of Kratzer (2006) and Moulton (2015). Evidence for this claim comes, on the one hand, from the fact that the use of *to/tte* as complementizers is restricted to verbs of saying and thinking; on the other hand, from the fact

that when *to/tte* complements are used with the verb *kiku* with the meaning ‘hear’ that has both an interpretation as a perception verb and a communicative verb, the only reading we get is the reading as a communicative verb.

- (10) a. *Watashi-wa kare-ga reeji-ni kaette kita tte / to kiita.*  
 I-TOP he-NOM midnight-at return come tte / C heard  
 ‘I heard (= I was told) that he came home at midnight.’  
 b. *Watashi-wa kare-ga reeji ni kaette kita no o kiita.*  
 I-TOP he-NOM midnight-at return come GEN ACC heard  
 ‘I heard (= I perceived) that he came home at midnight.’

Following Kratzer (2006) and Moulton (2015), we assume that a logophoric complementizer comes with an attitudinal component that is typically semantically selected for by an attitude verb.<sup>6</sup> Following Moulton (2015), we use the subscript *c* to indicate that *x* stands in for a content-individual. The lexical entry for *to* is the same as the entry of logophoric *that* (*that<sub>L</sub>*) on Kratzer’s account.

$$(11) \llbracket \mathbf{to} \rrbracket^u = \lambda p . \lambda x_c . \forall w' [\text{compatible}(x_c)(w') \rightarrow p(w')]$$

To account for the anti-performativity effect that we found with *tte* in a performative use, we assume that *tte* introduces an expressive anti-performative presupposition<sup>7</sup> (similar to logophoric mood in German; Sode 2014; Eckardt 2015): It requires that the content of the logophoric complementizer is not identical to the content of the actual speech act of the utterance *u* (expressed in *Z*) by:  $x \neq \text{content}_u$ .

$$(12) \llbracket \mathbf{tte} \rrbracket^u = \lambda p . \lambda x_c : x \neq \text{content}_u . \forall w' [\text{compatible}(x_c)(w') \rightarrow p(w')]$$

We call a logophoric complementizer that carries an anti-performative presupposition a **strong logophoric complementizer**.

The assumption of an anti-performative presupposition explains the anti-performativity effects as follows: Take an utterance of a sentence in (13-a) to be a performative utterance. Following assumptions about *that<sub>L</sub>* in Kratzer (2006), (13-a) is interpreted as in (13-b).

<sup>6</sup> See Simeonova (2020) for a recent discussion of logophoric complementizers and their relation to evidentials and logophors.

<sup>7</sup> We might as well have modeled the contribution as a conventional implicature in the sense of Potts (2005). For the notion of “expressive presuppositions” and a discussion of their relation to conventional implicatures, see Schlenker (2007).



- (13) a.  $[[\varphi \text{ to }] \text{omou}] \approx \text{'I believe that } \varphi \text{'}$   
 b.  $[[\text{(13-a)}]]^u = \lambda w. \exists x \exists s[\text{believe}(x)(s)(w) \text{ and } \text{possessor}(\text{speaker}_u)(s)(w)$   
 and  $\forall w'[\text{compatible}(x)(w') \rightarrow [[\varphi]](w')]]$

The only difference, if we switch from *to* to *tte*, is the addition of the anti-performative presupposition. Nothing in the semantics is in conflict with this presupposition. The anti-performativity effect is due to the pragmatics of the performative use. This is as it should be since the speaker's intentions with respect to the use of the embedding verb are crucial for the felicity. A speaker who uses (13-a) performatively intends  $[[\text{(13-a)}]]^u$  to be true in world  $u$  in virtue of (14)

- (14)  $\lambda \langle x, s, w \rangle . [\text{believe}(x)(s)(w) \text{ and } \text{possessor}(\text{speaker}_u)(s)(w)$   
 and  $\forall w'[\text{compatible}(x)(w') \rightarrow [[\varphi]](w')]]$

being true of  $\langle \text{content}_u, \text{situation/eventuality}_u, \text{world}_u \rangle$ , where  $u$  is the utterance/speech act performed and  $\text{content}_u$  = the content of the propositional act (Searle 1969) associated with  $u$ ; see Eckardt (2012) for similar assumptions in the discussion of the performative marker *hereby*. In particular, the  $\text{speaker}_u$  intends  $x = \text{content}_u$ , where  $x$  is the content of the expressed claim/belief in  $u$ . Let's call this the **content intention** associated with the performative act. As a result: *tte* can never be used in a performative utterance since its presupposition ( $x \neq \text{content}_u$ ) is in conflict with the content intention of the performative act (intending:  $x = \text{content}_u$ ), where  $x$  is the content of the expressed claim/belief in  $u$ .

What might be surprising about this proposal is that it does not attribute a reportative or quotative meaning to *tte* independently of the speech/thought act predicate it combines with: The semantic contribution of *tte* as a functional head maps a proposition to a property of contents of speech/thought acts. This contribution is neutral with respect to a reportative–performative distinction. The lack of a reportative/quotative meaning should not be thought of as a mistake but rather as an advantage of this proposal: If we assume that *tte* is a logophoric complementizer – which can be motivated independently and in analogy to *to*, as we have seen above – the only thing we have to assume to explain its pragmatic effects as an indirectness marker is the addition of an anti-performative expressive meaning. It correctly explains the reportative interpretation on a pragmatic level with minimal assumptions and thus prevents overgenerating by assuming that it has to combine with a speech/thought act predicate that cannot be used performatively by the speaker and therefore will result in a report.

- (15) logophoric complementizer + anti-performative presupposition  
(truth conditional meaning) (expressive meaning)  
 => indirectness marker (lexical use restriction)

## 5 Is *tte* in complementizer use ever a quotation marker?

There are clear cases where *tte* is used to introduce a quote.

- (16) Taroo-san-wa [watasi wa sakana-ga tabe-tai desu] tte itta.  
 Taro-TOP I TOP fish-NOM eat-want COP tte said  
 ‘Taro said: “I want to eat fish.”’

It is not only the quotation marks used in the written example that indicate a quote. Other signs are: (a) *watasi* in (16) refers back to *Taroo*; (b) in a non-quoted complement-clause *ga* is used instead of *wa* in the subject position; (c) the polite form *desu* is a root phenomenon that usually cannot be used in an embedded clause.<sup>8</sup>

But there are also clear cases where *tte* does not introduce a quote. Let’s assume that Taro told us yesterday that he plans to visit us today by using the sentence in (17-a). It would be truthful to report what he said yesterday by uttering the sentence in (17-b).

- (17) a. Asita-wa anata-no tokoro-ni ikimasu.  
 Tomorrow-TOP you-GEN place-to go  
 ‘Tomorrow I will come to visit you.’  
 b. Taroo-san wa kyoo uti-ni kuru tte itta.  
 Taro-TOP today home-to come tte said  
 ‘Taro said that he will come to visit us today.’

Notice that none of the words used in the report are used by Taro in his original utterance.

*Tte* can also be used in a statement that denies that a speech act with a particular content was made, as in (18). In this case, it is also difficult to argue that a quote is involved.

- (18) Daremo<sub>i</sub> kare<sub>i</sub>-no koto-o fukoo da to / tte iwa-na-katta.  
 no:one he-GEN thing-ACC unhappy COP C tte say-NEG-PAST  
 ‘Nobody<sub>i</sub> said that he<sub>i</sub> was unsatisfied/unhappy.’

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<sup>8</sup> It should be added that *to* can be used with the same quotative function in the same example.

What is more, *kare* in (18) has a bound interpretation on its intended reading. It is a well-established fact, at least since Banfield (1973), that binding into quotes is not possible. Therefore, if quotation was involved it could only be “mixed quotation” (see Maier (2014a) for the notion of mixed quotation).<sup>9</sup> We take these examples, in particular the example in (17-b), as strong evidence that *tte* does have a use as a *pure* indirectness marker.

A comparison with German reportative mood can show that the assumption that an account of *tte* as an indirectness marker can cover a wide range of examples that at first sight look like cases of quotation is credible. We would like to give two examples: (a) unembedded uses of *tte*; (b) embedded root phenomena introduced by *tte*.

*Tte* can be used in an unembedded clause to report what someone has said. In the same situation as above in (17), we could have reported what Taro said by uttering (19). Note that (19-b), for the same reasons as (17-b), is not a quote but indirect speech.<sup>10</sup>

- (19) Konoo Taroo-to hanasi-ta. ‘I talked to Taro yesterday’  
 Kyoo uti-ni kuru tte.  
 today home-to come tte  
 ‘He will come to visit us today, he said.’

We find similar examples in German with reportative mood in an unembedded clause indicating indirect speech.

- (20) Ich habe gestern mit Taro gesprochen. ‘I talked to Taro yesterday’  
 Er komme uns heute besuchen.  
 He come-REP us today visit  
 ‘He will come to visit us today, he said.’

Interrogatives with the volitional form *-oo* as in (21-a) are root phenomena in Japanese: They cannot be embedded under *kiku*. If the root clause is introduced by *tte*, on the other hand, it can, as in (21-b).

- (21) a. Pari-ni ikoo ka?  
 Paris-to shall-go Q  
 ‘Shall we go to Paris?’

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<sup>9</sup> Note that complements marked by reportative mood also allow for mixed quotation. Mixed quotation doesn’t exclude indirectness marking.

<sup>10</sup> We assume that the corresponding speech act predicate has to be recovered contextually in an unembedded use. Space restrictions prevent us from going into further details.

- b. Taro<sub>i</sub>-wa Hanako-ni kare<sub>i</sub>-to issho-ni pari-ni ikoo ka  
 Taro-TOP Hanako-DAT he-with together-with Paris-to shall-go Q  
 \*(tte) kii-ta.  
 tte ask-PAST  
 ‘Taro asked Hanako if they should go to Paris together.’

One could jump to the conclusion that (21-b) must be a case of direct quotation. But the pronoun *kare* (‘he’) in the embedded clause clearly indicates that the embedded clause cannot be a pure quote. For this sentence to be acceptable in Japanese, a special “quotation” intonation (rising on *ka*) is needed. This “quotation” intonation seems to be very similar to what we find in German under the name “colon reading”.

- (22) a. Peter fragte: Wollte man nicht gehen?  
 Peter ask-PAST want-REP one not go  
 ‘Peter asked if they shouldn’t go./  
 Peter suggested that they should go.’  
 b. \*Peter fragte, wollte man nicht gehen.  
 Peter ask-PAST want-REP one not go

The example in (22-a) shows many parallels to the example in (21-b). First of all, it features the colon reading that has its parallel in the “quotation” intonation. Second, the V1-clause following the colon is a root phenomenon that can never be used as a complement clause (22-b).<sup>11</sup> Third, the generic pronoun *man* (‘one’) could not have been used by Peter in his original statement, so *man* is an additional indicator of indirectness similar to *kare* in (21). Although we cannot spell out the details here, we assume that all these cases involving indirectness can in principle be covered by a proposal along the lines suggested here.

Coming back to the cases that we started out with at the beginning of this section: Could it be that even in examples like (16) *tte* is merely an indirectness marker and not a quotation marker? The answer to this question depends on whether there is independent evidence for a quotation strategy with a broader application in Japanese; see Maier (2014b) for such a proposal. The discussion of this matter goes beyond the scope of this paper. Here, we just want to point out that if there was such a strategy, one would have to rule out the possibility that the quotation of the whole clause in (16) is a special case of the application of this more general strategy. Because if

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<sup>11</sup> In fact, the special intonation needed might indicate in both the German and Japanese case that we do not have “real” embedding after all.

it was, there would not be a need to assume that *tte* in complementizer use is anything other than an indirectness marker.

## 6 Conclusion

We have presented experimental evidence that *tte* in complementizer use has an anti-performativity effect, i.e. *tte* can only be used when the embedding verb is used reportatively and not when it is used performatively. Our proposal analyzes *tte* in complementizer use as a logophoric complementizer with an expressive anti-performative presupposition. A comparison with German reportative mood – that shares with *tte* the anti-performativity effect – could show that a pure indirectness account that does not involve quotation can go a long way to account for examples that at first seem to involve quotation.<sup>12</sup> Given the considerations in the last section, we leave it for future research to determine whether there is a need for a second operator *tte* with a true quotative function besides the indirectness marker that we have argued for.

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<sup>12</sup> The proposed account is also compatible with *tte* being used in echo-questions; although it does not give any indication why *tte* is obligatory and *to* cannot be used.

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